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Abstract 
 
Past research has demonstrated a relationship between déjà vu and the entorhinal cortex in patients 
with wider medial temporal lobe damage. The aim of the present research was to investigate this crucial 
link in a patient (MR) with a selective lesion to the left lateral entorhinal cortex to provide a more direct 
exploration of this relationship. Two experiments investigated the experiences of déjà vécu (using the 
IDEA questionnaire) and déjà vu (using an adapted DRM paradigm) in MR and a set of matched controls. 
The results demonstrated that MR had quantitatively more and qualitatively richer recollective 
experiences of déjà vécu. In addition, under laboratory-based déjà vu conditions designed to elicit both 
false recollection (critical lures) and false familiarity (weakly-associated lures), MR only revealed greater 
memory impairments for the latter. The present results are therefore the first to demonstrate a direct 
relationship between the entorhinal cortex and the experience of both déjà vu and déjà vécu. They 
furthermore suggest that the entorhinal cortex is involved in both weakly-associative false memory as 
well as strongly-associative memory under conditions that promote familiarity-based processing. 
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Introduction 
 
The mistaken feeling of familiarity associated with encountering something known to be novel is a 
relatively oft-reported experience within the general population (for reviews see Brown, 2003; Illman, 
Butler, Souchay & Moulin, 2011). Known as déjà vu, this experience can arise for both people and places 
and critically the feeling of familiarity accompanying déjà vu is knowingly detected as a false memory. 
Hence the perceiver is aware that this feeling of familiarity is wrong, which importantly distinguishes 
this false memory from other types of false familiarity experiences such as false positives when the 
perceiver deems the sense of familiarity to be an actual true memory. In being able to detect that the 
source of the memory is incorrect (i.e., that the item is in fact novel despite the sense of having 
encountered it before), déjà vu experiences are also distinguishable from those experiences arising under 
Recognition Without Awareness paradigms. Within this paradigm, experimental manipulations such as 
speed of presentation and use of word fragments, enable participants to distinguish true from false 
memories in the absence of being able to identify the items per se (Cleary & Green, 2004, 2005; Craik, 
Rose & Gopie, 2015; Voss, Baym & Paller, 2008).  
 
In trying to understand the nature behind the déjà vu phenomenon, and given the difficulty in 
creating such experiences within laboratory settings, research has often focused on those clinical 
populations that appear to report elevated déjà vu during seizure activity. Temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) 
patients are typically divided into those that do (TLE+) and do not (TLE−), experience déjà vu 
experiences, prior to and during epileptic seizures (Gloor, 1990; Martin et al., 2012). Those TLE patients 
that do report déjà vu, experience the same sort of déjà vu experiences reported by healthy individuals, 
in being aware of having a false sense of familiarity. However, during seizure activity, these patients can 
also experience having visually intense flashbacks and hallucinations, the experiential richness of which 
clearly differs from simply a lower level sense of familiarity (Gloor, 1990; Martin et al., 2012). This 
observed distinction between the different qualitative experiences that can accompany déjà vu 
experiences as well as the need to provide a sound theoretical account of the causes of this phenomenon, 
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has provoked research into addressing key issues such as distinctions within the déjà vu experience, 
familiarity versus recollective contributions to déjà vu and the role of distinct areas within the medial 
temporal lobes to this experience. 
 
Given the difference in qualitative richness observed in the déjà vu experiences of TLE patients, an 
important distinction has been made between the terms déjà vu and déjà vécu, which are seen as lying 
on a continuum. Déjà vu, literally meaning “already seen”, reflects a brief disruption to low level 
familiarity in that the experience itself is not accompanied by any rich contextual detail such as visual 
illusion or emotion (Illman et al., 2012). Whereas déjà vécu, meaning “already lived” involves a 
contextually-richer and longer experience involving mental time travel and hence more reflective of 
recollection-based disruption and therefore unlike déjà vu, is more likely to involve a range of medial 
temporal lobe structures (Illman et al., 2012). 
 
Importantly the distinction between experiences of déjà vu and déjà vécu is one which TLE patients 
are aware of. Using the Inventory of Déjà-vu Experiences Assessment (IDEA), research has 
demonstrated that TLE patients were clearly aware of and could differentiate between healthy (déjà vu) 
and seizure-related (déjà vécu) experiences (Adachi, et al., 2010). Furthermore, in a single case TLE 
patient study, O’Connor and Moulin (2008) demonstrated that, whilst not being able to prevent persistent 
déjà vu experiences from taking place, by attempting to stop these arising prior to seizures, the patient 
could differentiate between healthy and seizure-based déjà vu. Taken together this research does not 
support the contention that the causes of déjà vu in patients is due to simple memory errors. Being able 
to recognise that the sense of familiarity experienced for something novel is incorrect is the critical 
distinction between experiences of déjà vu as opposed to a false positive when such a distinction cannot 
be made. The critical question is whether the déjà vu experiences in TLE patients are selectively linked 
to activity in restricted brain areas or whether such disruption is more widely evidenced across the medial 
temporal lobes. 
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According to dual process accounts of recognition memory (Aggleton and Brown; 1999; Montaldi 
& Mayes, 2010), within the medial temporal lobes, whilst the hippocampal system elicits the recollective 
process, the perirhinal system is responsible for the process of familiarity. Whilst evidence linking the 
hippocampal system purely to recollective processes in both healthy and brain-damaged patients has been 
robust (Brandt, Gardiner, Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem & Mishkin, 2009; Diana, Yonelinas, and 
Ranganath, 2007; Mayes, Holdstock, Isaac, Montaldi, Grigor, Gummer et al., 2004; Yonelinas, 2002), 
evidence linking the perirhinal system to the process of familiarity has been more sparse (De Vanssay-
Maigne, Noulhiane, Devauchelle, Rodrigo, Baudoin-Chial, Meder, et al., 2011). Nevertheless, several 
notable patient cases do exist. One case involves a TLE+ patient who following a left unilateral 
lesionectomy for intractable epilepsy which removed a large part of her left perirhinal system (perirhinal 
and entorhinal cortices) whilst leaving her hippocampal system intact, demonstrated a selective 
impairment for familiarity (Bowles, Crupi, Mirsattari, Pigott, Parrent, Pruessner, et al., 2007; Martin, 
Bowles, Mirsattari, & Köhler, 2011). A second more recent case involving an even more unique TLE+ 
patient with a selective lesion to the left lateral entorhinal cortex also demonstrated an impairment in 
familiarity in the context of normal recollection (Brandt, Eysenck, Kragh-Nielsen, & von Oertzen, 2016; 
James, Norbury, von Oertzen, Huppertz, & Brandt, 2018). The rarity of such patients makes the link 
between the perirhinal system and the process of familiarity more difficult to test, however these two 
cases support the contention of a selective relationship between the perirhinal system, and more 
specifically the entorhinal cortex and the process of familiarity. 
 
Given the evidence linking the perirhinal system to the process of familiarity, evidence should also 
exist linking these areas and familiarity to déjà vu experiences. Work in TLE+ patients has revealed that 
such a relationship is indeed robust. This has demonstrated that within the medial temporal lobes, the 
entorhinal cortex is the area that is most metabolically altered in such patients (Guedj, Aubert, 
McGonigal, Mundler and Bartolomei, 2010). In addition, déjà vu has been found to arise significantly 
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more when stimulating the entorhinal cortex compared to the amygdala or hippocampus (Bartolomei, 
Barbeau, Gavaret, Guye, McGonigal, Régis, et al., 2004). Furthermore, only TLE+ as opposed to TLE -
patients were found to have a selective impairment in familiarity as opposed to generic familiarity and 
recollective impairments (Martin et al., 2012), although such a behavioural distinction has been observed 
in one case patient who is non-epileptic/seizure-free (Edelstyn, Grange, Ellis & Mayes, 2016). The above 
research therefore highlights an important relationship between déjà vu, the entorhinal cortex and the 
process of familiarity. Importantly, O’Connor and Moulin (2013) demonstrated that no such relationship 
appeared to exist in healthy individuals as they found that neither recollection nor familiarity correlated 
with déjà vu propensity. This therefore suggests that the relationship between déjà vu, the entorhinal 
cortex and the process of familiarity is unique to TLE+ patients. Such a unique relationship might be due 
to TLE+ patients experiencing over stimulation to the entorhinal cortex during seizures that are over and 
beyond that experienced by both TLE- patients as well as the non-TLE population when experiencing 
déjà vu. However, this relationship has only been tested in patients with damage beyond the entorhinal 
cortex and therefore the precise contribution of this area to déjà vu elicitation remains unexplored. The 
aim of the present research is to therefore investigate the relationship between déjà vu and familiarity in 
a patient with a selective lesion to the left lateral entorhinal cortex. 
 
Experiment 1: IDEA (Inventory for Déjà Vu Experiences Assessment) 
The present experiment used the IDEA to measure quantitative and qualitative déjà vu experiences 
in a patient with a selective lesion to the left lateral entorhinal cortex in comparison to a set of matched 
control participants. This questionnaire has reliably been used on TLE+ patients demonstrating that they 
can differentiate between healthy (déjà vu) and seizure-related déjà vécu (Adachi et al., 2010) but the 
nature of the questions suggests they tap more strongly into addressing the latter type of experience. 
Given conversations with the patient in which she described in vivid detail both the déjà vu and seizure-
related déjà vécu experiences she had, we predicted that she would report quantitatively more, and 
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qualitatively richer déjà vécu experiences in comparison to controls, reflecting presumed wider medial 
temporal lobe activity disruption during her seizure activity (Bartolomei et al 2004). 
 
Methods 
Participants  
The University of Roehampton Ethics Committee and the National Research Ethics Service 
approved the experimental procedures for all present experiments reported prior to the start of the 
research. Furthermore, all procedures were carried out with written informed consent of the participants 
as well as the patient with all being informed they could withdraw from the research at any time and 
without having to give a reason. MR and seven healthy female control participants, all of whom were 
native English speakers and had fluent written and spoken English took part in the present research which 
was conducted at the University of Roehampton. The present set of control participants were matched to 
patient MR using a modified t-test developed for use in single case studies with small control samples 
(Crawford & Howell, 1998). No differences between MR and the controls were found in terms of age 
(MR = 50, controls = 49) nor on performance in the National Adult Reading Test (MR = 103, controls = 
108.28), p> .05. In addition, further neuropsychological profiling was carried out using the WASI 
(Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence), the Doors and Peoples Test and the WMS (Wechsler 
Memory Scale). Crawford’s t-test revealed no significant differences between MR and the controls on 
any of these measures p> .05, (see Table 1 for scores). Participants were given monetary compensation 
for their travel and participation.  
 
Clinical profile of MR 
A full clinical profile and 3T MRI scans for MR are provided in a previous paper (see Brandt et al., 
2016). MR is a right-handed female patient who started to suffer from complex partial seizures at the age 
of 36 which included partial seizures with déjà vu and complex partial seizures with or without déjà-vu. 
When MR was 42, a small cavernoma in her left anterior parahippocampal gyrus was diagnosed on MRI. 
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When MR was 48 she was referred for pre-surgical assessment and 3T MRI then confirmed that the 
lesion she incurred was restricted to the left anterior parahippocampal gyrus and more recently has been 
more specifically located to the lateral left entorhinal cortex (Brandt et al., 2016; James et al, 2018). 
Given MR’s clinical symptoms, the size and pathology of her MRI lesion and her EEG results, she 
presents as a well-defined case of left symptomatic temporomesial epilepsy due to a small cavernoma in 
the left entorhinal cortex (See Figure 1). 
 
Materials and Procedure 
The IDEA consists of 23 questions assessing the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the déjà vu 
experiences a person can have and is split into two parts. The first part is a general section assessing a 
person’s experience of déjà vu (e.g., “Have you ever had the feeling of having experienced a sensation 
or situation before in exactly the same way when in fact you are experiencing it for the first time”?) and 
answers are quantified ranging from “never” to “more frequently” with an option to respond “don’t 
know”. The second part of the IDEA consists of 14 questions that assess the qualitative aspects of a 
person’s déjà vu experiences (e.g., “While you have this feeling of recognition' can you remember 
exactly where and when you had the same experience or feeling before”?). The IDEA has demonstrated 
good reliability and validity (Sno, Schalken, de Jonghe & Koeter, 1994) and is therefore a useful tool in 
comparing the déjà vu experiences in TLE patients to the wider population. The IDEA is self-
administered and participants in the present experiment typically took about 10 minutes to complete it. 
 
Results 
The results were analysed using Crawford’s modified t-test. For Part 1 of the questionnaire, answers 
were scored such that the higher the frequency of the particular déjà vu experience the answer was 
addressing, the higher the score attributed to that question. For example, to the question “Have you ever 
had the feeling that it seems as if everything around is not real, as if it is not really happening?” the 
answer “never” scored 0, the answer “very infrequently” scored 1, the answer “sometimes” scored 2, the 
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answer “often” scored 3 and finally the answer “more frequently/at least weekly” scored 4. Total scores 
were then added up for each participant and revealed that MR (M = 3.63) had significantly more 
experiences of déjà vu in comparison to the controls (M = 2.34, SD = .47, range = 1.89 – 3.14), t(6) = 
2.56, p = .02. 
 
For Part 2 of the questionnaire, 5 of the 14 questions were quantifiable Yes/No questions. For example, 
to the question “Have you ever had this feeling of ‘recognition’ in one or more of the following ways?” 
participants could respond either Yes or No to 10 different statements (e.g., in a certain place, when 
meeting someone). The total “Yes” responses for each of these questions were then added up to give 
each participant one total score. This demonstrated that MR (M = 20) scored marginally higher than the 
controls (M = 10.42, SD = 5.12, range = 4 - 17), t(6) = 1.75, p = .06. The remaining 9 questions revealed 
that the main qualitative déjà vu differences emerging between the controls and MR, was in terms of the 
last time déjà vu occurred (MR = 1-5 years ago, controls = 1-12 months), duration of déjà vu (MR = 3-5 
minutes, controls = few seconds), full or partial relation of déjà vu to situation (MR = full, controls = 
some part), whether déjà vu occurs at a given time (MR = mornings, controls = no/don’t know) and 
finally whether déjà vu feels as if everything around is not real (MR = yes, totally unreal, controls = 
never/don’t know).  
 
One of the key qualitative differences between MR and the controls was to the question about the 
feeling of recognition happening in a number of ways (i.e., in a place, in a situation, during an activity, 
at a certain event, when meeting someone, whilst telling someone something, whilst listening to 
something, whilst having a thought, whilst reading). MR answered yes to all 9 possible ways (the controls 
answered mostly no to all 9 ways). In addition, she responded “yes” to experiencing this recognition “in 
some other way” and wrote: “When having a seizure, I drift off into a dream world state where everybody 
and any activities seem familiar, while everything around me, ‘reality’, becomes unreal-unrecognised.” 
This quote highlights that although the feeling of déjà-vecu is all encompassing for MR, she is still aware 
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this is based on a false sense of recognition in referring to this experience as a “dream world” and reality 
becoming unreal and unrecognisable. The results of the IDEA questionnaire therefore demonstrate that 
in comparison to the controls, MR has significantly more experiences of déjà vu. More importantly, they 
reveal that these experiences are qualitatively different to those of the controls, in being significantly 
more encompassing, vividly rich and lasting significantly longer. These experiences are therefore 
consistent with richer recollective disruption associated with the experience of déjà vécu (Illman et al., 
2012). However, the present results do not support previous research showing less, rather than more déjà 
vu in TLE+ patients (Adachi et al., 2010). This discrepancy is likely due to a key neurological difference 
between MR and the patients used in the Adachi et al (2010) research. Specifically, their patients had 
differentiating lesions to medial temporal lobe and hemispheric regions whereas MR has a selective 
lesion to the (left) lateral entorhinal cortex which is the area most heavily implicated in déjà-vu 
(Bartolomei et al., 2004; Guedj et al., 2010). This further reinforces the importance of using single case 
patients with selective lesions in order to more fully establish localisation of function. 
 
Given MR’s clear evidence of enhanced déjà vécu arising from seizure-related recollective disruption, 
the question remains whether under non-seizure conditions, she demonstrates greater experiences of déjà 
vu that are typically based on a sense of familiarity rather than recollection. This question was addressed 
in the following experiment that attempted to elicit both enhanced false recollective and false familiarity 
recognition within an experimental setting. 
 
Experiment 2: DRM 
The aim of the current experiment was to attempt to elicit déjà vu experiences experimentally by 
adapting a false memory paradigm and to see whether such disruptions gave rise to increased familiarity-
based déjà vu experiences in MR. This premise was tested using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (1995) 
(DRM) paradigm. In this paradigm, participants are presented with a list of words that are all related to 
a critical lure word that is not presented. Roediger and McDermott (1995) found that participants falsely 
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recall and recognise the critical lure word around 40% of the time, which is much higher than would be 
expected for a lure item (known as the DRM effect). This effect is believed to be due to each item on the 
list generating increasing associative strength to the critical non-presented word which then triggers 
(false) memory for that item. Indeed, research has demonstrated that the greater the associative strength 
of the presented words, the more likely the critical lure will not only be recognised, but be recognised on 
the basis of rich episodic recollection (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott & Gallo, 2001).  
 
Given the above finding, one possibility is that words with a weaker associative strength to the critical 
lure word, whilst still eliciting false recognition, might be less likely to do so on the basis of strong 
recollective processes. That is, the weaker associative strength of these items is less likely to generate 
rich episodic contextual cues at retrieval and therefore more likely to be accompanied by familiarity 
processes, the precise process that is implicated in eliciting the experience of déjà vu (Illman et al., 2012). 
Using DRM lists that generated the highest critical lure recognition, past research has shown that 
manipulating whether non-critical lures are related or not to the list presented, leads to an 18% false 
recognition rate for related lures (high familiarity, low novelty condition, Urquhart & O’Connor, 2014). 
These related lures were taken from the bottom of each DRM list and therefore represented the weakest 
associative strength items which are more likely to be falsely recognised on the basis of familiarity rather 
than recollective processes (Roediger et al., 2001). As such, the use of these items was deemed ideal in 
the present experiment in an attempt to elicit familiarity disruption. 
 
Hence, within the present DRM experiment, several key predictions were made. Firstly, that MR 
would demonstrate normal overall recall, recognition and recollection processes given her spared 
hippocampal system and past research showing these processes to be comparable between her and 
controls (Brandt et al., 2016; James et al., 2018). Secondly, that MR was expected to have similar levels 
of critical lure recognition as the controls given that past research has shown that recognition of these 
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lures is based on strong recollective processes (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) that are normal in MR. 
Finally, and most importantly, that MR should demonstrate higher false recognition for weakly 
associated lures. This prediction was made on the basis that such items would be more likely to disrupt 
familiarity processes that appear to be the key to MR’s selective familiarity impairment (Brandt et al., 
2016). 
 
Methods 
Participants  
The control participants were the same as in Experiment 1. The University of Roehampton Ethics 
Committee and the National Research Ethics Service approved the experimental procedures for all 
present experiments reported prior to the start of the research and all procedures were carried out with 
written informed consent of the participants as well as the patient. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants firstly took part in a recall test in which they were serially presented with 6 DRM lists 
taken from Deese and McDermott (1995). These 6 lists (Anger, Chair, Sweet, Doctor, Sleep and Needle) 
were selected on the basis of being those most likely to elicit false memory of the critical lure (Deese & 
McDermott, 1995). The procedures closely modelled those in the original paper. Each list contained the 
first 12 most strongly associated words of the DRM list (i.e., highest associative strength to the critical 
lure word). Each word was presented for 1500 msec with a 1000 ISI using Psyscope. The serial order of 
the words in these lists is such that the first word is the one most strongly related to the critical lure word 
with decreasing strength going down the list. Following presentation of the first list, participants received 
an immediate recall test in which they were given 2 minutes to recall as many words as possible and in 
any order. They were then presented with the second list and the same procedure ensued. After the 6th 
and final list was presented, participants received a 5 minute distractor task in which they were given 
sums to complete.  
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This recall test was then followed by a computer recognition test consisting of 60 words, 30 old (5 
target words from each list) + 30 new words (6 critical lures + 12 words taken from non-presented DRM 
lists [4 positive, 4 neutral and 4 negative] + 12 weakly associated words). The 12 weakly related words 
consisted of the 13th and 14th word from each of the 6 DRM lists. Hence, they were selected on the basis 
of being non-presented category members of presented DRM lists (e.g., yawn, cake, peace) that are the 
most weakly associated words in those lists to the critical lure word. Words were randomly presented to 
participants and for each word, participants were required to decide whether it had been previously 
studied (old) or not (new). Following a decision that the word was old, participants were further required 
to decide whether their recognition was based on contextual recall (remember response), recognition in 
the absence of contextual recall (know response) or simply a guess. (Please insert Figure 2 here). 
 
Results 
Recall 
The results were analysed using Crawford’s modified t-test (2-tailed) and revealed no significant 
differences between MR (M = .53) and the controls (M = .64, SD = .17, range = .33 - .92) in correct 
recall t(6) = -.60, p = .56. Nor were any differences found between MR (M = 1) and the controls (M = 
.60, SD = .30, range = 0 - .83) in terms of critical lure recall t(6) = 1.24, p = .25. Differences however 
were found in terms of unrelated false recall MR (M = 6) and the controls (M = 1.71, SD = 1.38, range 
= 0 - 4), t(6) = 2.98, p = .02. 
 
Recognition Memory 
Proportion of hits, critical lures and both weakly-associated and non-associated lures for remember 
and know responses were submitted to Crawford’s modified t-test. As the proportion of guess responses 
was too low and has also been shown not to reflect any memory discriminability (Gardiner, Ramponi & 
Richardson-Klavehn, 1998), no analyses were performed on these data. Correct (hits) and incorrect 
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(critical lures, weakly and non-associated lures) for remember and know responses were firstly analysed 
separately, both due to previous work demonstrating that MR’s impairment appears to reflect an inability 
to reject distractors rather than an inability to accept targets (Brandt et al., 2016; and so that any possible 
performance dissociation in MR between strength of semantic association within incorrect recognition 
(i.e., lures) could be identified. Secondly the results were also analysed following previous statistical 
methods on single case patients (Brandt et al., 2016, Bowles et al., 2007) using the correction of 
independence model whereby remember response accuracy (i.e., hits-false alarms) were taken as an 
indication of Recollection and with the correction of independence being applied to know responses 
[Familiarity = know/(1-remember)] to gain an estimate of familiarity (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). 
Finally recognition memory was quantified using the discriminability index d’ based on signal detection 
theory (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) and response criterion was calculated using the criterion location 
measure (C). Significance levels are given as 2-tailed unless specified. 
 
With regards to correct hits, no differences emerged between MR and the controls in terms of 
remember responses t(6) = -.38, p = .71. However MR scored significantly higher correct know responses 
t(6) = 3.74, p = .01 (please see Table 2 for all treatment means and ranges of scores). The analyses on 
critical lures revealed no significant differences between MR and the controls either in remember 
responses t(6) = .79, p = .45 or in know responses t(6) = 1.40, p = .21.  
 
In terms of non-associated lures, no differences emerged in remember responses t(6) = .31, p = .76 
and no analyses were performed on know responses as the controls did not make any of these type of 
responses. However critically, in terms of weakly-associated lures, significant differences emerged 
between MR and the controls both in remember t(6) = 1.98, p = .04 as well as in know responses t(6) = 
2.18, p = .03 demonstrating that regardless of memorial quality, MR made significantly more errors in 
rejecting weakly-associated lures. In fact, whereas the controls’ recognition of non-associated to weakly-
associated lures went up by 5%, MR’s error rate went up by 17%. The d’ analysis on remember responses 
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revealed MR (M = 1.05) performed similarly to controls (M = 1.86, SD = .94), t(6) = -.80, p = .45. Nor 
were there any difference in terms of response criterion (MR, M = .08, controls, M = .22) t(6) = -.46, p 
= .65. The d’ analysis on know responses revealed MR (M = .51) performed similarly to controls (M = 
.52, SD = .54), t(6) = -.01, p = .98. However MR was significantly more liberal when making these types 
of responses (MR, M = .87, controls, M = .1.87, SD = .24), t(6) = -3.89, p = .008. Finally, no differences 
emerged between MR and the controls either in recollection t(6) = -.70, p = .47 (MR: M = .42, controls: 
M = .64), or in familiarity, t(6) = .78, p = .46 (MR: M = .14, controls: M = .04). 
 
These results demonstrate that under conditions that support recollective-based recognition (correct 
targets and non-presented strongly semantically related words; i.e. critical lures), MR performs at the 
same level as control participants. However, under conditions that are likely to elicit familiarity processes 
(i.e., weakly associated lures), she performs significantly worse than controls. Importantly, MR’s normal 
performance under strong recollective-based conditions with impaired performance under weaker 
familiarity-based conditions, arose in the context of overall normal recognition memory. A full 
discussion of these results in relation to those of Experiment 1 are presented below. 
 
Discussion 
In trying to understand the mechanisms and brain areas involved in the process of déjà vu, previous 
research has demonstrated an important relationship between déjà vu, the entorhinal cortex and the 
process of familiarity (Illman et al., 2012). Additionally, this relationship with the process of familiarity 
but not recollection appears unique to TLE+ patients as opposed to both TLE− patients (Martin et al., 
2012) and healthy participants (O’Connor and Moulin, 2013). However, such a relationship has only 
been investigated in TLE patients that have extensive medial temporal lobe damage and therefore the 
precise contribution of the entorhinal cortex to the process of déjà vu and déjà vécu remains unexplored. 
The key aim of the present research was to therefore address this issue in a unique patient with a selective 
lesion to the left lateral entorhinal cortex. 
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The results of the IDEA questionnaire demonstrated that in comparison to controls, MR had 
significantly more encompassing and vividly rich experiences that were directly linked to occasions prior 
to and during epileptic seizures. This qualitatively rich experience is more reflective of déjà vécu than 
déjà vu and is consistent with the recollective disruption that is evidenced during seizure-based activity 
in TLE+ patients and which causes wider disruption within the medial temporal lobe area (Martin et al., 
2012). However, under non-seizure based laboratory conditions that give rise to déjà vu experiences, 
MR’s main impairment was found following manipulations that were more likely to enhance false 
familiarity (weakly-associated lures) compared to false recollection (strongly-associated critical lures). 
The present research is therefore the first to demonstrate a direct relationship between the entorhinal 
cortex and the experience of both déjà vu and déjà vécu and supports past research showing this 
relationship in patients with wider medial temporal lobe damage (Bartolomei et al., 2004; Guedj et al., 
2010). 
 
At first glance, the present results suggest a differentiating role of the left entorhinal cortex in 
semantic associative memory. Hence whilst strong semantic associations were not affected in MR (e.g., 
critical lure recognition), weaker semantic associations tapped into her memory impairment preventing 
her from being able to differentiate true from false memories. This supports previous research showing 
that MR’s impairment manifested itself in the false recognition of verbally-familiar distractors which 
were not strongly associated within the study list context (Brandt et al., 2016). However, they are not 
supportive with previous research demonstrating MR’s impaired performance for strong semantic 
associations within a priming paradigm (Brandt et al., 2016). In addition, in comparison to controls, MR 
demonstrated both higher levels of false remember and know responses for weakly-associated lures. 
Furthermore, her false remember responses were higher than her false know responses. This pattern was 
not predicted given past research showing MR has a selective impairment in familiarity alone (Brandt et 
al., 2016). However, this pattern was importantly the same for controls and therefore suggests that unlike 
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non-associated lures (that tend to be recognised more on the basis of familiarity rather than recollection), 
weakly-associated lures give rise to more false recognition based on recollection than familiarity. As 
strongly associated lures (critical lure) are also recognised more on the basis of recollection than 
familiarity (Roediger & McDermott, 1995), this suggests a common pattern of enhanced false 
recollection for all associative non-presented items, regardless of associative strength. Despite MR 
showing the same pattern of remember/know responses as the controls for false recognition, she 
demonstrated a different response criterion for them. Critically, her know responses, but not her 
remember responses, were associated with a significantly more liberal response criterion (as previously 
found, Brandt et al., 2016) and this in itself might also explain the greater know responses she made in 
correct recognition. 
 
Hence, the present results demonstrate that MR has a generic issue for weakly associated lures that 
is not specific to know responses that are reflective of the process of familiarity (Gardiner & Java, 1993). 
Furthermore, the present finding that MR demonstrates normal strongly associative memory (critical lure 
recognition) in light of previous research showing she has impaired strongly associative memory 
(priming, Brandt et al., 2016) suggests that she does not have a generic issue with strongly associated 
semantic verbal material. Rather, these results suggest that under conditions where experimental 
manipulations give rise to strong semantic associations based on the process of recollection (critical lure 
in the DRM paradigm; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), MR performs normally, however under 
conditions where experimental manipulations give rise to strong semantic associations based on 
familiarity (priming experiment in Brandt et al., 2016; Wang & Yonelinas, 2012), or only weaker 
semantic associations (weakly-associated lures), MR is impaired.  
 
These results are supportive of dual process models of recognition memory in two critical ways. 
Firstly, they support the separation of recollection and familiarity within the medial temporal lobes 
(Aggleton & Brown, 1999). Secondly, they reflect familiarity as being a continuous process of intra-item 
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sensory and perceptual integrations. In other words, stronger semantic associations reflect greater 
integration of an event leading to higher confidence familiarity whereas weaker integration only gives 
rise to less confident feelings of familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). MR’s spared hippocampal system 
supports recollective-based processing whereas her selective left lateral entorhinal cortex lesion impairs 
her familiarity-based memory both for strongly (Brandt et al., 2016) and weakly-associated (present 
research) verbal memory. 
 
One question that emerges is whether MR’s impairment reflects a generic recognition without 
awareness issue, in that she is unaware that the feeling of familiarity she experiences is incorrect or rather 
reflects a proper déjà vu experience in that she is aware that her sense of familiarity is misplaced. The 
evidence strongly points to the latter. Firstly, MR demonstrated normal levels of recall, recognition and 
recollection in comparison to control participants. Hence her memory issue is not a generic recognition 
failure per se, which is further consistent with previous research on MR (Brandt et al., 2016; James et 
al., 2018).  These results support those found by Martin et al (2012) who also found that TLE+ patients 
did not have a generic memory issue unlike their TLE- patients who did. Secondly, MR has indicated 
both in conversations and in her written description of what happens during her seizure-based déjà vécu 
experiences that she is fully aware that these are not based on true recognition and like previous patients 
can differentiate these from the normal déjà vu she experiences outside seizures (Adachi et al., 2010; 
O’Connor & Moulin, 2008). As the awareness that a sense of familiarity is false is the main characteristic 
differentiating déjà vu experiences from generic false positive recognition (Illman et al., 2012), these 
results strongly support the view that MR’s experiences are reflective of the phenomenon of déjà vu 
rather than a generic false positive recognition issue. Hence the present research demonstrates that MR’s 
lack of an overall memory deficit and her awareness of her false sense of familiarity, support the 
contention that her memory impairments are linked to déjà vu-specific issues when encountering familiar 
verbal material rather than a generic recognition without awareness problem per se (Cleary & Green, 
2004; Craik et al., 2015). Furthermore, they suggest that her selective left lateral entorhinal cortex lesion 
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causes her to have both high level disruptions during seizures leading to déjà vécu experiences, as well 
as lower level disruption outside seizures (for verbally familiar material) leading to experiences of déjà 
vu. 
 
In conclusion, the present research demonstrates that MR experiences both enhanced levels of déjà-
vu and déjà vécu in comparison to controls which are not a generic recognition without awareness issue. 
Rather her enhanced déjà vécu reflect enhanced false recollective experiences which are most likely 
caused by wider disruption to the medial temporal lobes during seizure activity (Martin et al., 2012). Her 
enhanced déjà-vu under non-seizure laboratory conditions, is most likely caused by her selective lesion 
to the medial temporal lobe area most involved in eliciting this experience; the entorhinal cortex 
(Bartolomei et al, 2004). This therefore is supportive of the contention that the déjà vu phenomenon is 
better viewed as being on a continuum whereby déjà vu experiences reflect low level disruption based 
on entorhinal cortex activity whereas déjà vécu experiences reflect high level disruption to more extended 
medial temporal lobes areas (Illman et al., 2012). Coupled with previous research (Brandt et al., 2016), 
the present research, in providing a more direct investigation between the entorhinal cortex, déjà vu and 
the process of familiarity, demonstrates the involvement of this brain area in both weakly associated false 
recognition and strongly associative recognition under conditions that promote familiarity rather than 
recollective-based processing. 
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Table 1.  
Controls and MR’s scores as a function of Neuropsychological Test  
 
 MR Controls 
WASI 114 102.14 (14.87) 
Doors and People 10 10.57 (3.99) 
 
WMS:  
  
 
General 
 
96 
 
105.28 (20.81) 
 
Auditory 
immediate 
94 99.71 (18.99) 
 
Visual immediate 
 
115 101.85 (16.34) 
 
Memory 
immediate 
105 100.85 (19.56) 
 
Auditory delayed 
 
92 101.57 (15.92) 
 
Visual delayed 
 
109 107.14 (18.52) 
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Auditory 
recognition 
delayed 
 
96 102.85 (22.51) 
Working memory 105 94. 42 (13.62) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Table 2.  
Proportion of hits and false alarms for MR and controls as a function of word type (Experiment 2). 
Hits Remember Know Guess Overall 
MR .67 .27 0 .94 
Controls .74 (.17) .07 (.05) .09 (.08) .90 (.10) 
 [.40 - .90] [.03 - .10] [0 - .23] [.70 – 1] 
 
Critical Lure 
  
  
MR .83 .17 0 1 
Controls .55 (.33) .05 (.08) .19 (.22) .79 (.27) 
 [0 - .83] [0 - .17] [0 - .17] [.33 – 1] 
 
Lures 
Weakly Associated 
  
  
MR .25 .08 .08 .41 
Controls .08 (.08) .01 (.03) .07 (.10) .16 (.15) 
 [0 - .25] [0 - .08] [0 - .25] [0 - .42] 
 
Lures 
Non associated 
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MR 0 .17 .08 .25 
Controls .01 (.03) 0 .11 (.15) .12 (.18) 
 [0 - .08] [0 – 0] [0 - .42] [0 - .50] 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Range of control scores in brackets. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. T2-weighted coronal imaging of MRs cavernoma (white arrow, EC = entorhinal cortex; CS = 
collateral sulcus). Orientation of the coronal images is perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the 
hippocampus and slice thickness is 2 mm. Following previous protocol (Insausti et al 1998) this series 
of images shows the landmarks used to identify the hippocampal and rhinal cortical areas. It would appear 
that MR’s cavernoma and its surrounding hemosiderin halo (surrounding susceptibility artefact = black) 
covers the lateral part of the left entorhinal cortex, as in Reagh & Yassa (2014). 
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Figure 2. 
 
 
Recognition test(60 words)
OLD (30 words)
DRM list Anger(5 words)
DRM list Doctor(5 words)
DRM list Needle(5 words)
DRM list Chair(5 words)
DRM list Sleep(5 words)
DRM list Sweet(5 words)
NEW(30 words)
Critical lures(6 words)
Non-presented items from non-presented  DRM lists(12 words)
Non-presented items of presented DRM lists (12 words)
